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I. The Current Opportunities Offered By The Labelling Information 
Schemes 
Labelling Information Schemes, whether mandatory or voluntary, are not 
by themselves solutions for Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
protection, but they can serve to find solutions in a broader context including 
mandatory regulation and incentives. In general, labelling schemes, particularly 
certification, are beneficial when they work hand in hand with regulation. 
However, it is not clear under what conditions they complement or substitute 
mandatory minimum quality standards2. 
Certification is usually easy to adopt, flexible and cheap, which makes it 
suitable also for developing countries. Many experts consider certification systems 
an option that allows government agencies to avoid controversy among powerful 
political players, be more effective, and spend less money3. 
Taxes and subsidies provide market signals and, along with regulations and 
Labelling Information Schemes, can be used to leverage more environment-
                                                      
2  “Certification raises the standards for market leaders while regulation forces up the standards for 
laggards. In contrast, certification is harmful if it saps the political demand for legislation that would 
impose minimum performance standards, thereby weakening overall environmental performance across 
the market”. A. Prag, T. Lyon, A. Russillo, Multiplication of Environmental Labelling and Information 
Schemes (ELIS): Implications for Environment and Trade, OECD Environment Working Papers 106 
(2016) 27. “The ‘certification’ route may be preferred because the certifying body provides increased 
credibility in the eye of users. But employing this route also runs some reputational risk if the certifier is 
found at fault, even for a completely different product or company. Furthermore, it may require costly 
supply-chain adaptations. Still, a majority of companies prefer to use this route, thereby outsourcing their 
environmental strategy. In contrast, the ‘private standard’ route allows the company to choose its 
objectives, and follow its preferred method, in a potentially more efficient way, and to better control 
reputation risks, provided it ensures full transparency (Mak, 2013). At the same time, self-declarations are 
generally viewed with greater scepticism by users who may perceive them as greenwashing”. G. Gruère, 
A Characterisation of Environmental Labelling and Information Schemes, OECD Environment Working 
Papers 62 (2013) 10.  DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3z11hpdgq2-en Despite this difference, broadly 
speaking, sometimes certification and label are used indistinctly in literature. 
3 “According to Müller (2002), many policy makers and politicians around the world support certification 
because they recognize it as less controversial than other policy tools such as taxes or binding regulations, 
and therefore easier to adopt. Many also believe that private certification may allow greater flexibility for 
innovation than governments can provide, and they see certification as a self-sustaining system requiring 
few public resources. Developing countries with fewer resources (such as expertise and funding) to 
develop robust regulatory regimes may find private certification particularly attractive as a way to open or 
retain markets in developed countries for their own countries’ products”. Steering Committee of the 
State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification, Toward sustainability: The roles and 
limitations of certification, RESOLVE Inc., Washington DC (2012) 36.  Available at 
http://www.resolv.org/site-assessment/files/2012/06/Toward-Sustainability-report-summary-and-
appendicesv2.pdf 
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friendly production and consumption patterns4. For instance, sometimes products 
that have been produced in an environmentally unfriendly way are not easy to 
recognise based on their physical properties. Market failures may occasionally 
occur in relation to information, both on the demand side and on the supply side. 
When consumers and businesses do not undertake (environmentally) favourable 
investments that would in the long run save them money because they do not have 
adequate information about the costs and benefits of the technologies, sometimes 
a tax preference could tip the balance. And for the suppliers of relevant goods or 
services, the potential inclusion of a product in a list of eligible technologies for a 
tax preference could serve as a motivating factor. Then again, a programme 
making relevant information available could address information gaps more cost-
effectively5. These reflections could be also considered in the case of promoting 
behaviours for more inclusive robotics. 
 
II. The Rapid Growth Of Environmental Labelling Information Schemes 
And The Multiplication Of The Role Of Public Authorities: The Need To Be 
Cautious If Designing This Type Of Measures For Robotics 
The number of Environmental Labelling Information Schemes (ELIS) has 
increased rapidly, especially in the late 1990s and in the period 2007-2010. Most 
still operate at the national level, and a growing share of ELIS use third party 
auditing or verification. Some ELIS are still non-transparent in their standard-
setting process, however there is a limited but relatively faster increase in 
transparent schemes6. The growth of ELIS could either strengthen or weaken 
                                                      
4 OECD, Environmentally related taxation, Environment at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators (2015) 70. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264235199-20-en OECD, The OECD database on Policy Instruments 
for the Environment, available at http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/Default.aspx. 
5 “Examples [on the demand side] could include government information campaigns, mandatory labelling 
of products with energy and environmental performance information, environmental performance ratings 
systems for products, and mandatory disclosure of energy and environmental performance information”.  
J. Greene, N. A. Braathen, Tax Preferences for Environmental Goals: Use, Limitations and Preferred 
Practices, OECD Environment Working Papers 71 (2014) 25, par. 62-64. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxwrr4hkd6l-en . 
6 The growth of ELIS is unequal, “according to different characteristics, such as communication means, 
channels, scope, and the standards on which they are based. Several shifts are noted, including from 
organic certification and ecolabels to single-issue labels and ISO type III labels, from non-profit to 
privately-owned ELIS”. “A high proportion of ELIS in the database does not use life-cycle approaches 
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political pressure to impose more stringent minimum quality standards 7 . 
Additionally, the recent evolution of ELIS could impact favourably on the future 
design of tax rules around the world.  
As civil society receives more and better information through ELIS, 
governments are able to act accordingly. Labelling is quite a complex affair, but a 
future common label or certification showing compliance with strict sustainable 
goals could imply certain minimum fiscal consequences everywhere—if globally 
agreed. In fact, the current convergence of standards in some sectors may serve to 
develop a new set of common tax expenditures. 
ELIS suppliers and users are flanked by five types of institutions: 
supporting institutions, inventorying institutions, policy support institutions, 
platforms and consortium and framing institutions. The public authorities may 
play a multifaceted role: as suppliers, governments may act beyond their 
responsibility on mandatory regulations as standard-setters and leaders, certifiers 
and promoters; and as users, public authorities may support schemes directly via 
green public procurement measures, or indirectly by promoting the use of specific 
schemes in meeting regulatory requirements8. They can promote the use of ELIS 
via awareness campaigns and education programmes, as opinion shapers, and 
additionally act to link up with one or more institutional groups, providing funding 
and promoting specific groups, funding inventories and consumer guidance efforts, 
regulating claims and labels, and interacting directly with platforms and policy 
supporting institutional actors9. The case is exactly the same for robotics. 
 
Observed roles of government 
Institutional role Identified specific role Observed examples in 
                                                                                                                                                            
and relies on standards based on non-product-related processes and production methods”. Gruère, supra 
n.1, at 37. 
7 Prag et al., supra n.1, at 27. 
8 B. Cashore et al., Introduction: Forest certification in analytical and historical perspective, in B. 
Cashore et al., Confronting sustainability: Forest certification in developing and transitioning countries. 
Report 8, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, New Haven (2006) Available at 
http://environment.yale.edu/publication-series/documents/downloads/o-u/report_8.pdf  
9 Gruère, supra n.1, at 20. 
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OECD countries 
As ELIS supplier 1. Setting Standard 
2. Managing Standard 
3. Certification 
4. Promotion 
 
Public ELIS examples 
Type I labels 
 
As ELIS user 
 
5. Public procurement 
6. Regulatory compliance 
 
EU procurement 
programme 
EU biofuel directive 
 
With supporting 
institutions 
 
7. Member of group 
8. Contributing to 
activities of the group 
9. Funding activities of 
the group 
10. General awareness 
and education 
 
GEN membership 
Mutual recognition of 
organic schemes 
Agencies funding IFOAM 
General consumer 
education programmes 
 
With inventorying 
institutions 
 
11. Leading public 
inventory 
12. Promoting 
inventories and guides 
13. Funding activities 
 
Danish guidance 
forbrug.dk 
Support of ITC Standard 
Map 
Ecolabel.be in Belgium. 
 
With policy support 
institutions 
 
14. As part of 
international 
organisations 
15. Leading analysis or 
dialogue internally 
16. Funding analysis or 
dialogue externally 
17. Funding academic 
research 
UNFSS, OECD, others 
Ademe (France) 
ENTWINED ( Sweden) 
PEF project (Germany) 
EU Research Frameworks 
With platforms and 
consortia 
 
18. Member of a platform 
19. Funding a platform 
 
Product Sustainability 
Forum (UK) 
Global Report Initiative 
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(IADB) 
 
As framing institutions 
 
20. Regulating and 
guiding claims 
21. Regulating labels or 
information systems 
22. Obligatory disclosure 
23. Contributing to 
international guidelines 
and standard-setting 
24. Actors in a trade 
dispute 
 
US Green Codes 
France’s practical guide 
on environmental claims 
EU Energy label 
Korea’s Carbon footprint 
label 
France (Grenelle 1 et 2 
laws) 
Canada’s EnerGuide 
ISO members 
Contribution to FAO and 
ITTO guidelines 
US and Mexico: Dolphin-
Tuna WTO disputes 
Source: Gruère, 201310. 
 
Certainly, Governments possess the capacity to advance certification 
systems, as they often have access to considerable technical expertise that can 
contribute to the development and maintenance of certification schemes, and 
Government endorsements can add credibility and legitimacy11. Not all agency 
action is based on industry “capture”, and environmental and social issues 
inherently reflect values of some kind. At its core, the mission of environmental 
agencies is value-laden12. The same would happen with European Union agencies 
dealing with robotics and AI. 
Nevertheless, in some cases, government officials may view certification as 
a threat to their power and can impede the progress of private certification efforts 
by creating competing government certification systems. However, Government 
roles change over time, depending on the needs of a nation’s industries, the 
                                                      
10 Acronyms: FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization. ITTO: International Tropical Timber 
Organization; PEF: Product Environmental Footprinting; IADB: Inter-American Development Bank. ère, 
supra n.1, at 20. 
11 Steering Committee, supra n. 2, at 34-35. 
12 Steering Committee, supra n. 2, at Appendix L A-255. 
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political climate or specific ways in which the certification scheme evolves at 
certain moments in time. 
At each stage of the regulatory process, voluntary standards, certification 
and labelling systems may provide a unique solution to a governmental void and to 
situations in which government exists and has authority to act but does not take 
action because of regulatory fragmentation or race-to-the-bottom dynamics13. 
The risk of underperformance or stagnation is high in cases in which 
certification replaces regulation, or where certification reduces the necessity to 
regulate (e.g. because of its success, a certification programme might replace 
improvements in the government’s minimum standards). If the certification does 
not update or improve at a pace at least as rapid as what would be achieved by 
market forces, the risk is greater14. 
Voluntary standards, certification, and labelling systems may counter a race 
to the bottom by creating market incentives for stakeholders to eliminate, reduce 
or internalise social costs15. Additionally, tax breaks are also powerful government 
                                                      
13 “Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems educate the public about the impacts of their 
consumption decisions, activate consumer norms, and facilitate the internalization into the price of a good 
the costs associated with avoiding social or environmental harm. In addition, they address the transaction 
costs that consumers face in locating and negotiating with the ‘cheapest cost avoider’ in global trade by 
creating structured links between those parties; they resolve both the information asymmetries and search 
costs that consumers face in purchasing credence goods by identifying conforming goods; they use 
structures that invite broad participation and deliberation, reducing the risk of capture during the 
standards-setting process; they provide training to develop an expanding number of experts to assist firms 
in adopting and implementing the standards; they use consumer markets and labels to incentivize 
compliance; they generate their own financial support—an important factor in maintaining legitimacy and 
effectiveness over time; and finally, their certification processes ensure that participants adhere to those 
standards”. Steering Committee, supra n. 2, at Appendix L A-255. “Calabresi and Melamed suggest that 
if legislators are uncertain about whether a legal entitlement is worth its cost to society, they should 
allocate the costs to the party that will be able to avoid the social cost most cheaply (the “cheapest cost 
avoider”). Calabresi & Melamed, supra [“Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability Rules: One 
View of the Cathedral”, Harv. L. Rev., 85, 1972], at 1096–97. If legislators are uncertain about which 
party would be the cheapest cost avoider, they should allocate the costs to the party that can most cheaply 
(a) locate the cheapest cost avoider and (b) pay them to avoid those costs.” Steering Committee, supra n. 
2, at Appendix L A-223. 
14 Steering Committee, supra n. 2, at 87. 
15 Steering Committee, supra n. 2, at Appendix L A-224.  
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tools that can influence certification16. A popular approach is to provide incentives, 
such as lower fees or tax credits, for meeting standards17. 
However, monetary incentives may “crowd out” some people’s willingness 
to protect the environment “voluntarily”, with possible implications for policy 
choice and stringency18. Another open question regarding payments for ecosystem 
services (e.g. grants and tenders) is whether they achieve “additionality”. That is, 
do they lead to environmental protection over and above the status quo?19. 
 
III. How To Overcome The Problem Of Wrong Signalling To The Public 
When the environmental signal that ELIS transmit deviates from the actual 
environmental performance of a certified product, either through 
“greenwashing” 20  (self-certification that is misreported or not subject to 
verification) or “greenbashing” (underreporting of a product’s actual 
environmental performance), this could discourage producers from further 
investing in the sustainability of their products. 
The standards used to assess environmental performance for ELIS should 
be appropriated to accurately measure the environmental quality of a product and 
tailored to local conditions. A structured typology reflecting the environmental 
performance of products or services and the signal transmitted to consumers by 
ELIS is reproduced below. 
 
Matching Environmental Performance with ELIS Signals 
                                                      
16 The Tuscany Regional Government supported small and medium-sized enterprises seeking to become 
certified to the SA8000 standard for social accountability by providing tax breaks on national insurance 
and regional tax payments. Steering Committee, supra n. 2, at 34. 
17 Steering Committee, supra n. 2, at 75-76. 
18 However, since it is difficult to know whose behaviour is likely to be “crowded out” by a given policy 
instrument and for which reasons (intrinsic or social) this remains an area requiring further research. J. 
Shogren, Behavioural Economics and Environmental Incentives, OECD Environment Working Papers, 
49 (2012) 7. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k8zwbhqs1xn-en 
19 Z. Brown, B. Alvarez & N. Johnstone, Tender instruments: programme participation and impact in 
Australian conservation tenders, grants and volunteer organisations, OECD Environment Working 
Papers 85 (2015) 3, 7. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js4k0t30hvc-en 
20  OECD, Environmental Claims: Findings and Conclusions of the OECD Committee on Consumer 
Policy (2011) Available at https://www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/48127506.pdf  
 9 
 
Source: Prag et al., 201621  
 
Enforcement against misleading claims should be effective at penalising 
false environmental claims, preventing them in the future and encouraging valid 
claims. The tax rules could, indeed, indirectly help to improve enforcement in cases 
where a label has been unduly alleged to secure a tax incentive, since the improper 
enjoyment of tax incentives is already punishable in every domestic legal order. 
 
IV. The Required Interaction Of Standards Systems 
In a system combining several tools or approaches, the real contributions of 
standards and certification can be gauged by asking first whether and how 
sustainability outcomes would change if the standards and certification had never 
existed, and second, whether and how sustainability outcomes would change if 
they were taken away22. The importance of the dynamic impacts of a standard 
                                                      
21 “Instances of correct quality-signal matching can be found in the (green) cells along the diagonal 
running from the top-left corner to the bottom-right corner. Greenwashing (red) and greenbashing 
(yellow) – the most extreme cases of misalignment between label signal and environmental performance 
– are located in the top right and bottom left corner of the matrix, respectively. Examples of moderate 
misalignment can occur along two dimensions”. Prag et al., supra n.1, at 24. 
22 “The evidence indicates that Energy Star played a key role in catalyzing widespread improvements in 
energy efficiency for consumer goods, including changing the expectations of consumers. And it is not 
clear that without Energy Star, this change would have occurred (at least in the absence of other actions). 
If the programme were to suddenly disappear, it would not be expected to significantly impact the status 
quo. This indicates a need for different approaches going forward. One would be to update Energy Star so 
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(through updates or the establishment of new ones) and the need to be clear about 
the roles of different forms of governance (e.g. local regulations incorporating 
standards being used to provide tax credits for the best performers or used to set 
minimum standards for anyone involved with some projects) must be stressed. 
In the coming future, the private sector and the public authorities could rely 
on certain internationally accepted certificates to, respectively, enjoy (while 
exerting their corporate social responsibility) and grant (with a better control), 
more efficient and fairer tax incentives, aligned with the sustainable development 
goals. 
Abusive behaviour in relation to the “greening” of imported products may 
be counteracted by the use of a well-defined certification system23. To generate 
such a system, government and non-government bodies may respond to ELIS 
multiplication through mutual recognition of schemes and the creation of focal 
standards. Convergence in some sectors, such as forest certification, may lead to 
more holistic and streamlined ELIS24. 
 
Interactions of Standards Systems 
                                                                                                                                                            
that it continues to move the market—for instance, by benchmarking Energy Star minimums at the top 20 
percent of industry performers. A second route would be to leave Energy Star unchanged, but to 
implement a more stringent minimum efficiency standard. A third option would be to develop a new 
standard aimed at incentivizing the top of the market”. Steering Committee, supra n. 2, at 87. 
23 Certification methods that take into account the risk of fraud should permit to reduce it. Problems of 
fraudulent certificates took place under the Kimberley Process, which illustrates that the risk of abusive 
behaviour and fraudulent certificates should not prevent the development of environmental cross-border 
taxes. In 2002, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was created. This certification scheme 
required participating countries to adopt certification and control measures so as to prevent the trade of 
‘conflict diamonds’. Kimberley Process, available at https://www.kimberleyprocess.com Pirlot, supra 
n.4, at 395-398.  
24 Prag et al., supra n.1, at 11. Outside the environmental field, in the social ambit, another experience 
may illustrate a possible route for joint action: The European Commission encouraged Member States to 
treat the new pan-European personal pensions product (label ensuring standardization of core product 
features, such as transparency requirements) in the same manner as similar existing national personal 
pension products, even if they do not satisfy all national criteria for tax relief. This will complement 
existing state-based solutions, without replacing or harmonizing national regimes. Furthermore, Member 
States should exchange their best practices. The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) will be in charge of authorising these products and maintaining a central register. 
National supervisory authorities will remain in charge of supervising product providers. EIOPA will also 
monitor the market and survey the annual supervisory plans of national competent authorities. European 
Commission Press Release IP/17/1800, Commission launches a new pan-European personal pensions 
label to help consumers save for retirement, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1800_en.htm . Oana Popa, EU Update, European Taxation, Vol. 57, No. 9 (2017) 
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 Description Examples 
 
Full Mutual recognition 
(equivalency) 
 
Agreement among and 
between two or more 
ELIS whereby the 
systems and standards of 
schemes are assessed and 
agreed by each scheme as 
being equivalent to one 
another 
 
Type-I ecolabels, as 
coordinated through the 
Global Ecolabel Network, 
product labels such as 
Energy Star, various 
national organic 
standards 
 
Unilateral recognition 
and other means of 
“stepping up” 
 
One-way recognition 
whereby all the systems 
and standards of one 
scheme are assessed as 
being equivalent by 
another scheme, but this 
is not reciprocal. Other 
means of “stepping up” 
include specifying that 
producers should 
graduate to more 
stringent ELIS 
 
4C, Rainforest Alliance, 
UTZ 
(coffee) Controlled Wood 
– Forest management 
(FSC) 
 
Harmonisation and 
inter-operability 
Adjustment of differences 
and inconsistencies 
among different 
standards, systems or 
definitions 
to make them uniform or 
mutually compatible, 
including sharing of 
assurance systems 
 
Union for Ethical 
Biotrade and Rainforest 
Alliance 
“Meta-regulation” or 
meta-coordination 
 
ELIS operators, standards 
bodies and/or private 
sector stakeholders 
collaborating to reinforce 
a credibility advantage, at 
the same time acting to 
maintain more stringent 
standards and coordinate 
standards, processes, etc. 
ISEAL, Global Sustainable 
Seafood Initiative, 
Sustainability Consortium 
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Source: Prag et al., 201625  
 
A multi-government-backed label or certification might promote worldwide 
sustainability in specific sectors, for instance by sharing the economic impact of 
related tax expenditures among the countries in the whole production chain. This 
could be, at least, useful for sustainability-transition. 
 
V. Labels And Standards: Their Possible Use in Public Procurement In 
Support Of Common Societal Goals In the European Union  
After the European Union case law detected some inconsistencies (e.g. 
Judgment of the EU Court of Justice of 10 May 2012, European Commission v 
Kingdom of the Netherlands26), the existing public procurement rules, adopted 
                                                      
25 Prag et al., supra n.1, at 40.  
26 NL:EUCJ, 12 May 2012, Case C-368/10, European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:284. The Court (Third Chamber) declared that “on account of the fact that, in the 
tendering procedure for a public contract for the supply and management of coffee machines, which was 
the subject of a contract notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 16 Aug. 2008, 
the province of North Holland: 
–        established a technical specification incompatible with Article 23(6) of Directive 2004/18 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for 
the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, as amended 
by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1422/2007 of 4 December 2007, by requiring that certain 
products to be supplied were to bear a specific eco‑label, rather than using detailed specifications; 
–        established award criteria incompatible with Article 53(1)(a) of Directive 2004/18 by 
providing that the fact that certain products to be supplied bore specific labels would give rise to the 
grant of a certain number of points in the choice of the most economically advantageous tender, 
without having listed the criteria underlying those labels and without having allowed proof that a 
product satisfies those underlying criteria by all appropriate means; 
–        established a minimum level of technical ability not authorised by Articles 44(2) and 48 of 
Directive 2004/18 by requiring, on the basis of suitability requirements and minimum capacity levels 
stated in the specifications applicable in the context of that contract, that tenderers comply with the 
‘criteria of sustainable purchasing and socially responsible business’ and state how they comply with 
those criteria and ‘contribute to improving the sustainability of the coffee market and to 
environmentally, socially and economically responsible coffee production’, and 
–        prescribed a clause contrary to the obligation of transparency provided for in Article 2 of 
Directive 2004/18 by requiring that tenderers comply with ‘the criteria of sustainable purchasing and 
socially responsible business’ and state how they comply with those criteria and ‘contribute to 
improving the sustainability of the coffee market and to environmentally, socially and economically 
responsible coffee production’, 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to fulfil its obligations under the aforementioned 
provisions”. 
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pursuant to Directive 2004/17/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, were revised in order to “increase the efficiency of 
public spending” and to “enable procurers to make better use of public 
procurement in support of common societal goals”, as stated in Recital 2 of the 
Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU.  
The EU Law on public procurement now in force allows environmental 
concerns to be considered at the different stages of the procurement procedure, as 
socially responsible public contracts expand at different territorial levels of 
government27.  
Environmental criteria can be included in the contract as long as they do 
not produce direct or indirect discrimination. There is flexibility to choose on 
price-quality ratios —and quality can include environmental aspects. In particular, 
Green Public Procurement rules allow the public authorities to make references to 
labels subject to particular conditions, and criteria underpinning the labels can 
also be specified. Contracting authorities can refer to particular labels, such as the 
European eco-label, multi-national eco-labels or any other label provided that the 
requirements for the label are linked to the subject matter of the contract. They 
should keep in mind the nature of the contract and the specific goal pursued in 
each case at stake. The requirements should be adopted on the basis of objectively 
verifiable criteria, using a procedure in which stakeholders can participate and 
should assure that the label is accessible and available to all interested parties—
Recital 75 of the Directive 2014/24/EU. 
 
VI. Final remarks 
The current research carried out on Environmental Labelling Information 
Schemes has paid attention to the problems and solutions experienced in this field, 
according to the most recent literature. It shows a path that could be quite easily 
followed when trying to adopt criteria for inclusive robotics and its promotion for 
                                                      
27  COM (2001) 566 final, Interpretative communication of the Commission on the Community law 
applicable to public procurement and the possibilities for integrating social considerations into public 
procurement, OJ C 333, 28 Nov. 2001 at 27. Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 Feb. 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28 Mar. 
2014 at 65. 
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a sustainable future in the global agenda. In addition, some supranational rules 
addressing public procurement could be used in support of this challenging 
common societal goal. 
